

Lula's PT Brazilian Workers Party Decline: a Guide for Foreigners

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Abstract: This case study examines the relationship between political communication and collective emotions. It shows that the upheaval caused in the popular mood against Lula and his party during the Brazilian election of 2018 was the decisive factor for the defeat of Fernando Haddad, the Workers' Party (PT) candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. Factors such as the arrogant stance of PT politicians, the corruption of its top representatives in government and parliament, and the contempt by PT against opponents and allies have aroused feelings of anger, indignation, humiliation, and hatred in a significant portion of the population. These emotions gave rise to the mass movement that elected Jair Bolsonaro and threw Lula into prison and ostracism. International commentators ignored this emotional fact of antipetism. They preferred to emphasize the authoritarian characteristics of the anti-leftist candidate elected in the country.

The decline of Workers Party (PT) came to a peak after Fernando Haddad's defeat in the Brazilian elections to the Presidency of the Republic in October 2018. This professor, former minister of Education and mayor of the city of São Paulo replaced Lula as the candidate of the party due to his imprisonment. The courts convicted Lula for corruption.



Lula: the loser Jair Bolsonaro: the winner

His opponent, Jair Bolsonaro, a former soldier and leader of the Liberal Social Party (PSL), a new and small political party, won 55.1% of the votes. A large contingent of militants who over time had rebelled against PT's preaching celebrated with fireworks this result. This group of voters also denounced and opposed PT main representatives' misbehavior, a practice that included collection of bribes, purchase of votes from parliamentarians from other parties, dissemination of false defamatory dossiers against opponents, collection of company allowances, diversion of resources from the oil company Petrobrás, fiscal maneuvers and evasion of foreign exchange.


PSL's victory came despite many contentious positions by its candidate. Bolsonaro criticized women "who should earn less than men at work because they become pregnant," the LGBT community, blacks, native people and refugees, an inability that led many anti-PT advocates to vote in favor of PT. As a result, two slogans appeared in the social media. The first one said: *I will never forgive Jair Bolsonaro for making me to vote in PT.* The second, in reverse, said: *I will never forgive PT for having me to vote for Jair Bolsonaro.*

It turns out that moral ambiguity plagued the (A) 26,421,688 voters (24.69% of the total) who had voted for the other candidates defeated in the first round of the election. In that phase Jair Bolsonaro received 49,227,010 votes (46, 03% of the total) and Fernando Haddad was chosen by 31,342,051 (29, 28%) voters. Those who voted nil and blank totaled (B) 10,313,141. As a result, a segment of (A + B) 36,734,829 voters (C)


¹These are the members of the research group "Communication, Emotions and Conflict" of the School of Communications, Arts and Design of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) – Brazil. This study was supported by CNPq.

had to redirect their choices in the second phase of the election. Some of them remained in doubt. The question they asked themselves was *which option is the lesser evil?*

Result of the first round of the 2018 election



Bolsonaro x Haddad x other candidates



The publicity campaign led by the two candidates in the second phase of the election was aimed at winning the sympathy of the undecided (C) and strengthening the confidence of the captive voters. This was a new chapter in a long journey through which the control of political narrative was the goal of these two camps. PT has always fostered the existence of external enemies - capitalism, the media, the military, entrepreneurs, rural producers, US imperialism, the *coup* against Lula and Dilma Rousseff and neoliberalism, for example. The recurrent messages of PT's activists, the political acts of the party and the cooptation of national figures such as the musician Chico Buarque de Holanda, and international ones like the Americans Noam Chomsky and Danny Glover and the French José Bové always focused attention in these fights between PT and opponents.

The *Letter to the Brazilian People* released by PT in 2002 aimed at calming the financial market. There was then a crisis of distrust with Lula's new elected government. To achieve this goal PT and Lula modified to some extent their antagonistic stance. The document said then "Brazil wants to change. Change to grow, to include, pacifying. Change to conquer the economic development that we do not have today and the social justice we so long wait for. "

This party emerged in 1980, thanks to the combination of groups linked to the Catholic Church, trade unionists, environmentalists and communist militants, some of them guerrilla soldiers who fought in the 60's and 70's against the government in the Brazilian jungles of Araguaia under the inspiration of the Cuban revolution. Others, such as former President Dilma Rousseff, belonged to VAR-Palmares, the group responsible for urban guerrilla actions in the same period.

PT gradually gained the sympathy of the Brazilian electorate. At his best, Lula achieved an 87% popularity in 2010. Many Brazilians and foreigners were fascinated by his figure, a worker who became a union leader and later turned into charismatic leader and reference to the left. The same kind of charm had made the Polish leader Lech Walesa an international celebrity at the height of the cold war. Later on, it would be the turn

of Mandela in South Africa and of Zapatist Commander Marcos. Parallel to his gradual decline in Mexico, Hugo Chaves, the Venezuelan, would rise to the podium.



National and international groups and personalities that have been interested in Lula were averse to economic and cultural globalization, international corporations, the IMF, media power, the World Bank and economic liberalism. They would meet in Porto Alegre in 2001 to participate in the first edition of the World Social Forum (WSF). The initiative sought to counteract the Davos Economic Forum created in 1971 and the Freedom Forum whose activities began in 1988 in Porto Alegre as well. The WSF was a reactive initiative and later became an educational and propaganda tool for the reformist ideals of the organization. Its main and famous slogan was "Another World Is Possible".

In 2001, PT was administering Porto Alegre. This southern Brazilian city became famous for its *participatory budgeting*, a political experiment that gave the population the right to decide where the government should make public investments. It seemed to the left that this example of *participatory democracy* indicated an innovative direction for public administration. The *participatory budgeting* also served as a political flag and a piece of PT propaganda effort abroad.

However, shortly afterwards, in 2002, the party promised in the *Letter* to follow in some extent the economic guidelines adopted by Lula's predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a politician who until then had been treated with contempt and debauchery by PT militants. The next period between 2003 and 2005 was the PT's honeymoon with entrepreneurs and other sectors of society previously described as despicable elite.

I. Communication and Emotion

The case under analysis is useful to document the relationship between political communication and collective emotions (Marcus, 2000). *Anger* was a latent star, although the decisive one in the Brazilian election of 2018, the moment when the upward trajectory of PT ended. Despite the numerous definitions in the literature on this emotion Berkowitz (1999, p. 420) says that people exposed to conditions perceived as unpleasant become over time inclined to aggression and violence.

Certainly, economic liberalism attracted a relevant segment of Jair Bolsonaro nearly 58 million voters. Another one, however, saw in his figure the only way to end both PT's political dominance and the cultural hegemony of the left. In fact, this party credibility and reputation began to be shaken in 2005, when the press denounced the purchase of votes of the opposition in parliament by Lula's government.



The *No-He* popular campaign against Bolsonaro

The goal of PT supporters involved in this psychological warfare of 2018 was to maculate Jair Bolsonaro's public image. For example, the Public Prosecutor's Office began to investigate who were the creators of the *Bolsomito 2K18* virtual game. In it, Jair Bolsonaro was the main protagonist and players earned points by killing people belonging to minorities and militants of social movements. Also, another initiative, the *No-He* campaign, brought together about four million people on Facebook.




Street demonstrations organized by this movement protested against Bolsonaro candidacy accusing him of being homophobic and male chauvinist.²

In 2018, the Internet became the main media of Brazilian politics, repeating what had happened in the United States with the election of Donald Trump and in France with Emmanuel Macron's campaign. In 2015, opposition to Dilma Rousseff also managed to mobilize crowds through the social networks asking her deposition (Wainberg, 2015). The excitement of collective emotions such as *rage* and *hate* was made possible by the diffusion of denunciations, the televised judgment of PT leaders, war cries, fake news, paid postings (Chen et. al., 2011) and the diffusion of conspiracy theories.

Researchers from Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ) showed in a study that the supporters of Bolsonaro had a greater reach and a better organization in the dissemination of fake news than supporters of other candidates.³ The UERJ research group followed a rumor and showed it appeared 202 times in 41 of the 90 monitored groups, 37 of them in support of Bolsonaro. It also showed that such organized cheerleaders tried to control public narrative and often tried to banish those who did not conform to their terms.⁴

It is worth recalling that sharing an emotion is the main factor that sustains virtual communities (Chmiel, et al., 2011). The fact that a public manifestation of a feeling by someone is relevant information to others (Schwarz, 2010) explains why it helps members of a cluster to coordinate their actions (Huebner, 2011).

Congressional representatives elected by the PSL and PT in 2014 and 2018



It turns out that even without official funding for its campaign, and thanks to the intensive use of social media, the PSL managed to elect, in addition to Bolsonaro, the second largest congressional bench, behind PT. The PSL had a single deputy elected in 2014, and in 2018, it got 52 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. PT fell from 68 to 56 candidates elected. In the decisive phase of the election, Jair Bolsonaro attracted 8,570,830 votes from non-captive voters (or 23.33% of C). Fernando Haddad captured 15,698,855 (42.8% of C). Finally, another group of 11,094,698 (30.2% of C) abstained and avoided taking a decision.⁵


² <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-45700013>

³ <https://apublica.org/2018/10/grupos-pro-bolsonaro-no-whatsapp-orquestram-fake-news-e-ataques-pessoais-na-internet-diz-pesquisa/>

⁴ The spread of hate on the web has in fact become a worldwide problem. Facebook claims to have taken off the air in the first half of 2018, 2.5 million posts of this type. This means that they contained violent or degrading discourses, statements of inferiority, or an incentive to segregate people.

⁵ In the first round abstention got 29,941,171 voters (20.33% of the total) and in the second 31,371,704 (21.3% of the total).

Result of the second round of the 2018 election



Between the first and the second round of the election, the competing parties told two stories. As it happens in dramas, there was also in this case a shared context, heroes and villains, plots, emotions and messages shaped and directed to well-identified target audiences.

II. CONTEXT

The divisive context shared by Lula's supporters and Lula's opponents did not appear from day to night in Brazil. It matured from 2002 to 2016, the year in which the Brazilian parliament removed President Dilma Rousseff from power. In these 14 years of PT's control of political power, Lula was a predominant figure. As said, this prominence ended when the national press denounced him and other main political leaders for corruption.

It is difficult to perceive from abroad the degree of irritation caused in a significant part of the country's public opinion by the rhetorical dissimulation of PT dignitaries. The denialism of this party also fell ill among the opposition. This party had boycotted the electoral assembly in 1984 and the new Brazilian Constitution passed in 1988. It also opposed the 1994 Real Plan, the economic program that brought down hyperinflation in the country.

III. VILLAINS


The villain of Bolsonaro supporters is PT and its top leader, Lula. This party is accused of having divided the country with its (1) divisive rhetoric only abated in 2002, with the rise of Lula to power. It was clear then that radicalism had been useful for the conquest of power. However, to be able to govern PT moderated its choleric discourse. It also seems to be occurring with Bolsonaro in the post-election period of 2018. Despite sustaining a rebellious, antagonistic and hostile attitude against economic liberalism, the pragmatic trait of PT policy ended contradicting those who were most adverse to capitalism. In order to be able to negotiate with opponents PT gave up a number of its ideological positions. As a result, even some sympathizers saw PT as a *physiological* party, an accusation PT uses to make against several traditional actors and politicians. This term means a political relationship based on the exchange of favors to the detriment of the public interest.

As mentioned, the villainy of (2) corruption became part of PT's political strategy. It also included controlling state institutions, official bodies, public enterprises and universities, among many other institutions. As mentioned, these facts provoked in society a huge and growing malaise. As a result, PT behavior and decisions have created the ideal conditions for Bolsonaro growing popularity, that is, the new massive phenomenon of *antipetism*. The international commentators did not capture this emotional rancor preferring to highlight the authoritarian trait of Bolsonaro personality.

From 2002 to 2018, popular opposition to the PT grew. In 2002, it was 38.73% of the electorate. In 2006, it reached 39.17%, rising to 43.95% in 2010 and to 48.36% in 2014. In 2018, it reached the


aforementioned 55.13% of voters. This fact helps to explain why in the 2018 elections Fernando Haddad won in only nine northeastern Brazilian states (Brazil has 26 states).

Evolution of opposition to the PT



IV. HEROES

The opposition hero is Jair Bolsonaro. This former military was an aggressive enemy of PT. His radical stance fell well among those who, over time, had hidden in silence with the advance of the left. He also challenged the prevailing common sense, which was favorable to the liberality of customs. The conservative turn is backed up now by powerful new actors, among them evangelicals (the ascending red trace on the chart). This group was able to elect Marcelo Crivella to the municipal government of Rio de Janeiro in 2016, this being the first sign of its new political power. In addition, there is now in the Brazilian National Congress the *Evangelical Parliamentary Front*. It brings together evangelicals from various parties who unite in the fight against abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage and other controversial issues. Several prominent personalities of this Front belong to the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, the institution led by Pastor Edir Macedo, Brazil's largest neopentecostal organization.



Fontes: Censos Demográficos do IBGE.

Colaborou: Elisa Rodrigues, professora da Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, e Rodolfo Almeida (arte).

It is worth recalling that Jair Bolsonaro converted in a ritual performed in the sacred waters of the Jordan River, in a locality near the city of Tiberias in north Israel⁶. Since then, along with his wife, he attends evangelical temples. The new moral attitude of this group has rescued this conservative trait of the Brazilian population, which is interested in preserving the values of the traditional family. Although Catholicism has exerted a strong political influence throughout the history of the country (the descending green trace in the chart), this one, was generated indoors, in the sacred environment of the church, an emotional space in which the preacher plays a leadership role and guide. The slogan of Bolsonaro, *Brazil above all, God above all* expresses and sets the tone of this new trend. Certainly, the evangelical media empire also played a part in this campaign in favor of Bolsonaro.

⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YI2nBsPvuyg>



Sérgio Moro

Giovanni Falcone

Eliot Ness

Over time, many others became part of the rebellion against PT. This is the case of Sérgio Moro, the one responsible for condemning Lula to prison and now appointed Minister of Justice of the new administration. To exercise the new activity, this federal judge decided entering politics. His journey in the fight against corruption is similar to the one fought by the Italian judge Giovanni Falcone, assassinated by Mafia in 1992. His death resulted in the Operation Clean Hands, the investigation that changed the political life of that country. The Brazilian population also sees Public Prosecutors as saviors of the homeland.



The Untouchables in Brazil and the United States.

Sérgio Moro and the Prosecutors recall to some extent the group of Eliot Ness, the heroes of *The Untouchables*, the title given to the dramatizations that immortalized this police officer and his group in their fight against Al Capone and sale of alcoholic beverages in the United States. The decision of the Moro surprised many in the Brazilian judiciary and allowed the conspiracy theory of a right-wing plot to spread among leftists with ease. In November 2018, he was still adjusting himself to this new political role, slowly and carefully approaching the Brazilian military and the press.

Moro's rise is due to another equally decisive latent emotion. His condemnatory sentence against Lula satisfied the population's desire for *revenge* and aroused the *hope* that justice was being done. Not by chance, Moro became a celebrity and a popular campaign supporting his figure spread throughout the country.



As a result, a new hero replaced Lula. Fernando Haddad adjusted to the role of successor and heir of his political heritage. His soft talk and his calculated rhetoric improved PT stance and drew the sympathy of many. In this effort of seduction, Haddad surprised the public by removing of its propaganda material the revolutionary symbols of PT. He also left aside the image of the former president and the slogan "We all are Lula". It has eliminated the background red tone replacing it with the national colors. He also transformed his slogan from "Brazil is happy again" to "Brazil for all". Finally, PT introduced Haddad to the public as being a humble and intelligent man, with family values.



The image of Lula disappears from the campaign along with other symbols of PT.

One day before the election, his rejection was 36% of the electorate while that of Bolsonaro was 43%. The catalyst for this result was Bolsonaro's sympathy to the military dictatorship implanted in Brazil between 1964 and 1985. On the opposite side, large portions of the public opinion welcomed his denunciation of the effort made by PT and its ally, the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), of communization of the country. This suspicion is not new. It was present in the arguments that justified the military coup of 1964. This crowd was also very suspicious of the intimate relations of PT governments with Cuba and Venezuela.

V. EMOTIONS

As mentioned, in this dispute *ire* was the main emotion exchanged between both sides. This sentiment grew even more among the anti-PT forces after Jair Bolsonaro's assassination attempt by a former Socialist and Freedom Party (PSOL) militant, a fact that occurred in the city of Juiz de Fora a month before the date of the election. PT, for its part, cried in self-victimization. Lula declared himself politically persecuted. He and others now label PT antagonists as Fascists. As it has happened in several places, this entry nominates in current Brazilian political prose anything that is politically undesirable by the speaker (Orwell, 1946; Weil, 2005).

After the election, the defeated leftist camp began to use its new slogan - Resistance, in particular to Bolsonaro's suggestions. He aims to arm the population against banditry, to prohibit party and ideological militancy of teachers in schools, to break or limit Brazil's diplomatic relations with Cuba and Venezuela, to promote the privatization of hundreds of Brazilian state-owned enterprises, to honor the country's armed forces, to align itself with the United States, to eliminate the program that brought Cuban doctors to Brazil, and to extradite Cesare Battisti to Italy. This former communist activist received from PT refugee status after facing condemnation in his country to life imprisonment for four politically motivated homicides.

VI. INDULGENCE

The supporters of *antipetism* have been indulgent to the rhetorical diatribes of Jair Bolsonaro. This trait also accompanied PT and the left over time. Lula's supporters often justify the excesses of social movements. The most common example of this attitude was the complacency toward the invasions of land and private property promoted by the MST (Landless Rural Workers Movement). In his program of government, Bolsonaro wishes to include this type of action in the category of terrorist crime.

The truth is that it has been difficult for PT militants to admit the corruption of its main activists. Gilberto Carvalho, a former head of the General Secretariat of the Republic, was one of the few who called for PT to "visit its demons." That is, it needs to "correct problems" that have "hurt, offended and disappointed (the Brazilian) society." A number of disappointed PT militants chose to fall silent and others abandoned political activity. However, a few spoke loud and clear about its degradation. Tarso Genro, Lula's former Justice Minister, is one who mentions the need to reform the party.

One of the PT's oldest militants, Hélio Bicudo, said the party "is a dirty page that needs to be turned once and for all in our history." The sociologist Francisco de Oliveira stated, "Lula is much smarter than you imagine. Lula has no character. He is an opportunist." Frei Betto commented: "PT exchanged a project for Brazil for a project of power". According to political scientist Francisco Weffort, "the PT spirit was different in 1980." Economist and journalist Paulo de Tarso Venceslau was also tough: "The party is over. What remains in it are religious remnants that make PT a sect."⁷

VII. MESSAGES

Enemies of PT accused the party of patrimonialism, an ancient evil of Brazilian political history. It is the tendency to make the state a private property of the ruler. PT did not escape this kind of virus that stung his soul and injured his flesh. Bolsonaro and his team announced a rectifying action on this. The same has happened in the past with other political actors who also promised this ethical cleansing action. These were the cases of Jânio Quadros in 1961, Fernando Collor de Melo in 1990, and the military coup of 1964. In the past, the national press had made the same accusation of corruption against Getúlio Vargas. Disappointed and frustrated, this former dictator of the country committed suicide in 1954 with a shot in the heart. That is, this moral crisis has lasted for at least 64 years.

⁷ <https://istoe.com.br/o-desencanto-dos-petistas-de-raiz/>

It is a historical fact that some politicians one day are the heroes of the masses and in the other are defeated, arrested, beheaded, shot or exiled. The classic example is Themistocles, the one who found refuge among the Persians, his most odious enemy. The French monarch Louis XVI would finish his days guillotined in 1793. Popular rebels killed Kaddafi in Libya in 2011. The same had happened with Benito Mussolini shot dead by antifascist partisans in the village of Giulino di Mezzegra in 1945. The wall in which the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, were machine-gunned by rioters on December 25, 1989, has now become a tourist attraction in Romania. George Bush (father), despite succeeding as a political leader of the US military campaign against Saddam Hussein in 1991, lost the presidential election the following year, a fact that led him to abandon public life. Something similar happened to Winston Churchill, the charismatic hero of World War II. His conservative party would lose the British elections of 1945. Lula would end up following this trend, imprisoned now in the Federal Police.

Therefore, a political leader needs to control the collective emotions otherwise they will control him. That is why Machiavelli suggested to the Prince to govern through fear and coercion. Aristotle in Rhetoric had proposed that through the agitation of certain emotion the leader can influence the audience that he is expected to lead. Other classical authors have also dealt with this relationship between politics and emotion. Among them are Thomas Hobbes, Friedrich Nietzsche, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, Sigmund Freud and Carl Schmitt.

In the case under analysis, the agitation of moral feelings (Rawls, 1971) is what explains the rise of the PT as well as its decay. Largely, this effect is the function of political communication. In evoking an emotion, it aims to motivate and organize cognition and human action (Izard, 2010, p.367). This is the classic case of protest, for example. The excitement of feelings "can transform passive citizens into challenging demonstrators (Woods, et al., 2012)."



An example of it was the Bolsonaro call for people to shoot "PT supporters. Since they like Venezuela so much, this group should go there..."⁸ In another video, he would say that "these marginal reds will be banished from our homeland."⁹ Images of feminist protesters favoring Haddad invading and disrespecting religious temples were equally disseminated through social networks.

Haddad in turn called Bolsonaro "the worst of the National Congress. An aberration, which only speaks of violence. There is only hatred in his heart. A sickly figure. He only vomits barbarities." Haddad labels Bolsonaro as "soldadinho de araque" (a nobody).¹⁰ While PT militants described the PSL candidate as misogynist, Haddad was deconstructed by the *Bolsonites* as being a puppet of Lula.

Political campaigns can be seen as the actor's effort to amplify certain emotions (Woods, 2012, p.575), especially those that underlie the collective soul (Le Bon, 1985). In the case of *antipetism*, besides *anger* there was also *indignation* (or *resentment*). This second sentiment expresses the opposition of one or more persons to a situation deemed unjust. The two emotions together also empowered the Brazilian extreme right, an ideological position that had succumbed in the past due to the social embarrassment. They are asking for a *new coup d'état* led by the military. In response to this cry, the army declared itself vaccinated against the temptation to assume political power, a fact that occurred not only in 1964, but in eight other opportunities throughout Brazilian history (in 1823, 1840, 1891, 1891, 1930, 1937 and 1945).¹¹ However, this refusal though authentic is not absolute. The Brazilian military often warns the Brazilian public that they are vigilant and that troops will only come on the scene in the last instance, if social cohesion succumbs, if governability disappears and chaos takes over the country. It is also true that in some moments the Brazilian generals conspired very discreetly on the need for this type of action.

Another truth is that the military will be present in the new government in civilian clothes. The plans of the new administration are being prepared with the participation of a large contingent of specialists linked to the armed forces. This fact led an analyst to classify the new Brazilian government sworn in in January 2019 as *democracy under tutelage*.¹²

⁸<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-QRMbxFhOU>

⁹<https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/eleicoes/2018/noticias/2018/10/22/bolsonaro-banir-vermelhos-patria-pt-comparar-hitler.htm>

¹⁰https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=7&v=SEpV26it3Bo

¹¹ Communists tried a coup d'état in 1935.

¹² This comment was made during a private conversation. That is why the analyst's name is kept confidential and will remain so until he decides to express this opinion publicly.

Humiliation (Bleiker & Hutchison, 2007) is another emotion that helped to frame and model the cognition of Brazilian voters in 2018. It recalls Hume's classic statement (2000) that "reason is, and can only to be a slave to the passions; can only pretend to serve them and obey them." Aristotle also suggested in Rhetoric that "the facts do not appear in the same prism to those who love and hate them, nor are they the same for the man who is indignant or calm"

VIII. Conclusion

Emotion results from one's assessment of a specific situation. In this sense, it is a relevant political information. It explains why survey follows such reactions. They assess the degree of popular esteem toward a certain candidate, personality, and political propositions. These surveys also help assessing the degree of *collective trust*, the most important public emotion. Stability of a society depends on it.

Largely, political communication aims to strengthen the public's faith in the state, the leader, the political actor and his decisions. This case shows the result of this type of trauma, the one that changes the popular esteem and the degree of confidence of a society toward personalities considered irreplaceable.

The decline of PT analyzed in this study documents this type of result. Confidence in this party and in Lula collapsed in 2018. The election of Jair Bolsonaro was one possible answer to it. In this phase predominated more the distrust to Lula and PT than the blind faith of the people toward Bolsonaro. The case again reveals the relevance of negative emotions to politics. They generate hope and are the engine of change. In 2002, with their help PT was able to produce this result. In 2018, it was the turn of Jair Bolsonaro.

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