

The divided brain and experiential research

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Abstract: *The relationship of theory and practice is always the problematic for academic researchers into practicum. In the past, the research has experienced some difficulties in supporting the importance of theory within arts practicum and vice-versa. In this paper I argue that experiential research acts to overcome this blockage as it brings practice and theory together into a rich mix of knowledge for the academy. As the basis of his thinking about linear and lateral thinking, Ian McGilchrist asks us why the brain is so 'profoundly divided' (2010:1). In this paper I respond to his thinking from my own observations about non-traditional research methods, particularly experiential narrativity that leads me to what I describe as the subjective academic narrative in/as research. In this paper, I look at how theory and practice come together in researching arts-based activities, particularly practice led/based research (PL/BR). This adds to knowledge about the arts and it more importantly brings forward the arts as contributors to scholarly knowledge within the academy. In developing understanding of the importance of participative enquiry, I look at the enhancement of understanding of PL/BR through the explication of metaphor such as collage and rhizomatic knowledge production. I discuss how Academic discourse becomes relevant to creativity when we enter into scholarly research and the contribution to this of qualitative research methodology such as experiential research. This paper acts to consider how a researcher might operate in a non-traditional research practice that looks at methodology and theory in relationship to experience.*

Theory and practice; the divided brain; knowledge and creativity

I. Introduction

In every field of communication, there are very specific discourse conventions regarding situating academic work within the current academic debates. Such academic discourse is a significant aspect of research dialogues and these dialogues may vary from subject area to subject area and from time to time. Today, such academic literacies exist as generative aspects of complex thinking rather than as merely conveying information or commenting upon others' complex thinking. At the same time, they remain a metadiscourse of a particular academic community and their aim is to enable expert readers who can successfully and fruitfully 'navigate the text' (Dahl 2004:1812) within their own discourse communities. Whatever the subject area or time, however, academic knowledge involves us in what Andrew Northedge calls entering into: '...high status discourse communities, which have successfully established claims to "expertise" within the wider society...' so that knowledge '...arises out of a process of discoursing...' and '...to be knowledgeable is to be capable of participating in the specialist discourse...' (2003:19-20 his italics). Such privileged academic discourse resides within a particular and dominant eurowestern view of knowledge (Spivak 2000). Such a view has been established according to a very particular understanding of what it is to be human that is clearly expressed by Descartes as 'cogito ergo sum' or 'I think, therefore I am'. It has been the basis of scholarship since the Enlightenment, and has led to the Cartesian binary and scientific methodology being accepted as the model for scholarly knowledge (Midgley 2010; Gallop 2002). General discussions about qualitative vs quantitative methods of scholarship have abounded, yet many scholars admit to the singularity of their work as a narrative in whatever mode. With the development of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology there has been a growing interest in brain function and its relationship to knowledge production.

II. The connected/divided brain

The two hemispheres of the brain are both divided and together: what might this mean? Ian McGilchrist alludes to contemporary popular understanding of the brains hemispheres thus: '...the left hemisphere is somehow gritty, rational, realistic but dull, and the right hemisphere airy-fairy and impressionistic, but creative and exciting...' (2). He asserts that: 'in reality, both hemispheres are crucially involved in reason, just as they are in language; both hemispheres play their part in creativity' (2). However, he also believes that the asymmetry of the two hemispheres has special significance leading humans to modes of experience that are different and need to co-operate. Unfortunately, rather than leading to co-operation, this difference has been hijacked by 'a sort of a power struggle' (3) between them that in Western culture has accepted functioning of the left hemisphere over that of the right in institutionalised late capitalism. He believes that the functions of the two hemispheres whilst complementary also need to be kept apart and that each is important in its own ways in enabling us to understand and function in society. Today, '...the balance of power has shifted where it cannot afford to go-further and further

towards the part-world created by the left hemisphere'. McGilchrist sees this as flawed because the left hemisphere is 'ultimately dependent' even almost 'parasitic' upon the right. The dominance of this has immense influence upon how we understand and operate as it has led to 'an increasingly mechanistic, fragmented, decontextualized world, marked by an unwarranted optimism mixed with paranoia and a feeling of emptiness...' (2010:6). He emphasises that he supports both reason and imagination, science and the arts, his only quarrel being with '...an excessive and misplaced rationalism' (7). For him, the study of the hemispheres of the brain is far from reductive: the way the complex neuronal structure of the brain functions is a central to how we experience, perform and form our world.

Although both hemispheres act and interact, the asymmetrical nature of the brain and their being able to operate apart indicates for McGilchrist 'a different way of *being* in the world' that cannot be simplified to objective versus subjective (31). How does this appear in scholarship?

III. Collecting, Manipulating & Reporting Data

The basis of academic research is data collection. There are two main domains of data: raw and manipulated. Raw data is the information that is accrued by a researcher, whether for qualitative or quantitative purposes. This is data that is as it was when the researcher first discovered it. Traditionally, very few researchers presented raw data even when presenting it as a narrative. Indeed, traditional quantitative methodologies arose from traditional dominant western modes of academic study and are utilised to show scientific methodology as the basis of academic work. The reasons for this are complex, but they relate closely to the rise of the Enlightenment period of the nineteenth century when science came to dominate knowledge production. In this scientific/quantitative model there is a search for 'truth' that is based on observation and research rather than religious beliefs so a very specific research question is posed, data is collected through closely recorded observation and/or experiments, there is repetition for further proof and the outcomes of the research is recorded and represented in a statistical manner. This record is reviewed by peers and published in academic journals for peer academic information and to generate further debate and discussion.

Such a scientific academic model has obviously led to great advances in the sciences including engineering, medicine, mathematics and the pure sciences that are undertaken for the joy of knowledge. In this model it is generally expected and accepted that the very word 'I', much less the concept of self as data, should never appear in a scholarly tract. Such a closed and prescriptive academic discourse model has been basic in scholarly communities generally and in some more than others. Barbara Kamler & Pat Thomson describe this as scholars '...positioning themselves to be seen as legitimate knowers within particular scholarly communities' (2004: 197)

Increasingly, this dominant western knowledge model has both continued to dominate academic patterns and has also been questioned. This is especially so in the Arts and Social sciences as new models of knowing have evolved and been accepted since the mid 20th century. In contrast to traditional Western scientific, logical and hence linear methods of dealing with data (left brain), less linear and far more openly narrative modes (right brain) have become acceptable within qualitative methodologies and even in scientific models. Useful narrative terms describing postmodernist influence on knowledge claims have arisen, for example that scholarly data and writing up can consist of a 'pastiche'. This describes a process in which there is no singularity but rather everything is made up of many elements that can be identified through irony, parody and subversive readings against what is put forward as 'real' or even 'truth'. The term 'montage' is also used to describe how there are multiple levels of meaning and interpretation available through a text that is not linear and dominated by traditional patriarchal forms but asks for ambiguity, disorder and random readings. Another term, 'paralogy', is used to describe what may be seen as an anti-method articulating its singularity and emphasising that it is against speaking for others.

Today, of course, the term 'text' is no longer applied only to written communications but can be applied generally and generously so that everything, including architecture, art, science etc, is able to be 'read' as a text open to critical interpretation and multiple meanings showing there is no singular authorial voice. Arising from literary criticism, Jacques Derrida's term 'différance' also calls for sensitivity to otherness, deferring to difference and making space for others. His famous term 'deconstruction' calls for researchers to act against given constructs by showing how they are a construction and hence could be constructed differently. Another useful metaphoric term is 'palimpsest' that describes superimposing one text upon another to show how each is able to be challenged as a construction. Yet another useful term is 'bricolage': a bricoleur is a handyperson who makes do with what is at hand so that every production is a 'one off' that does its work well, but is not predictive nor able to be reproduced. Such terms when applied to data collection and writing in the academy act against systems, showing them to be what Jean-Francois Lyotard describes as 'terror' caused by claims to totality; and an 'incredulity towards metanarratives' is urged by Lyotard to act against this (Lyotard 1984:xxiv).

Terms such as these indicate the fragmentary nature of knowledge rather than its certainty, and have begun to be widely applied to ways of thinking. They indicate that scientific models of knowledge are constrictive and unrealistic even in traditional methodologies, as they implicate thinkers in the act of putting together ideas as a painstaking linear construction that attempts to construct an unreachable yet highly desirable 'objective reality'.

Today, the researcher increasingly reveals her or his self and explicates involvement in participative enquiry IN the research as contrasted with some detached enquiry ON the research project.

This revelation of involvement is particularly relevant in arts-informed research that follows practice led/based (PL/BR) or studio methodologies. Experiencing the activities that are the subject of the research project means that objectification is overcome and that such experiential ways of researching to add to scholarly knowledge are more fully understood both by the researcher and the proposed audience (Butler-Kisber&Poldma 2010:1). Moreover, language itself no longer dominates many forms of research data production and even critical analysis but is enriched or even replaced by more visual or creative modes of expression (Eisner 2008). For Lynne Butler-Kisber and Tiiu Poldma, '...experiential ways of knowing and understanding, or research approaches that involve a tangible way of doing, such as arts-informed enquiry, are a means of making tacit ideas explicit and make new insights possible for both the researcher and the research audience' (2010:2). This is particularly relevant not only to research involving visual literacies in the arts but also to that involving the newer forms of online and computer generated and technologically expressed arts.

The description of collage by Butler-Kisber and Poldma as a methodology is important in itself but also stands as a useful metaphor for the nature of research that takes fragmented instances to form new representations, thus adding to scholarship. That is, it describes an '...epistemology that posits that there are multiple realities and ways of doing and understanding' (2). Thus, collage is more than a genre of art: it also represents a fractured way of knowing about/and doing '...because it allows the researcher to work in a non-linear and intuitive way by arranging image fragments that reveal unconscious connections and new understandings' (3). Of course, such 'fragments' need not be only visual: in postmodernist terms such non-linear constructions of knowing might be what Deleuze and Guattari (1981) describe as rhizomatic or growing indiscriminately like grass rather than in an orderly fashion like the tree of knowledge. In a similar way, the effect of their collage metaphor is to represent the non-linear function of experiential research.

The relationship of theory and practice is always the problematic for academic researchers into practicum. In the past, the research has experienced some difficulties in supporting the importance of theory within arts practicum and vice-versa. Experiential research acts to overcome this blockage as it brings practice and theory together into a rich mix of knowledge for the academy. For example, experiential research using collage is described by Butler-Kisber and Poldma as enabling a move from structured research planning to openness, collaboration, creativity and even enjoyment. It can capture elusive ideas as well as lead to deeper and more nuanced understandings of research data. Their caveat is interesting: '...researchers wishing to use collage in formal and public products need to develop the necessary skills to produce technically sound work and develop aesthetic sensitivities so that the gains that have been made in arts-informed inquiry in the last decade are not lost by the proliferation of poor-quality work' (5). They recognise, however, that the process of collaging as a research experience can provide useful data and make the 'research process transparent'.

Another experiential methodology is concept mapping that for Butler-Kisber and Poldma '...allows the researcher to make sense and keep track of data interpretations as they first begin to emerge...by giving a visual sense to messy thoughts' (6). Such recognition of the importance of free-ranging thoughts in the research process is a significant contribution to knowledge models within the academy. The ways that the brain works are becoming more and more interesting in all discussions of research methodologies. For Butler-Kisber and Poldma, concept maps 'allow the researcher to step outside the constraints of linear thinking and to engage in, and encourage the messy and nonlinear work of, the brain, and in doing so, tease out ideas and connections in the data that might otherwise remain implicit. It is when these implicit thoughts become apparent that the analysis can be pushed to a deeper level' (12). Recognising the experiential nature of research also recognises that the brain is being employed in a way that challenges the western cultural metanarratives that underpin traditional knowledge models based on linear research techniques.

IV. Western cultural metanarratives and emergent neurological theory

Discussions today about the ways in which the brain itself operates have led to McGilchrist's (2010) provocative proposition (that may be read eventually as a metaphor rather than a neurological fact) that thinking itself has become dominated by the power of linearity that is embedded in use of the left brain. This has led to the diminution of the importance of the arts and humanities in contemporary dominant euowestern based cultures. He develops the thesis that the more organisationally orderly left side of the brain, the 'emissary', should be under the direction of the more disorderly right side of the brain, the 'master' since this is where we are able to relate, vitally, humanly and as part of a 'whole(s)' (Read 2012:119). Yet the 'left hemisphere, with its obsession with analysis and its tendency to denial, has usurped the leading role. The overview function of the right side of the brain produces broad vision whilst the left has more specific and categorical thought processes, thus Mary Midgely proposes that the scientific has moved us towards a precision that values theory more than experience (Midgely 2010).

So what appear to be two divided hemispheres in the brain may stand in reality or metaphor as upholding the dichotomy between '...alienation versus engagement, abstraction versus incarnation, the categorical versus the

unique, the general versus the particular, the part versus the whole, and so on...' (McGilchrist 461-462). It is possible that neurology develops through responses to the cultural milieu. Read describes these possible 'biological routes' as effecting the ways that '...the very structure of the brain may be substantially responsive to and moulded by-not merely functional for- the fabric of any given culture (2012:124). McGilchrist's description of a 'power grab' by the left hemisphere as 'relatively mechanical...abstract and disembodied, distanced from fellow-feeling; given to explicitness; utilitarian in ethic; over-confident of its own take on reality, and lacking insights into its problems', Bob Trubshaw sees as seeming to be 'culturally constructed'. At the same time he rejects as only an 'interesting suggestion' the idea that 'everything that is wrong with the West has come about because the left hemisphere took over from the right hemisphere and a once idyllic working partnership has broken down' (Trubshaw 2013:120).

McGilchrist states, however, that his 'emphasis is always on the need to transcend the "either/or", exclusive mode of processing, of the left hemisphere, to see that *both* hemispheres play a vital part in understanding the world', however, his emphasis is that 'reason does not know what it is that reason does not know' (Trimble 2011:288). This book is, states Jacob Freeman in his review, 'in essence...an exploration of the link between the brain's hemispheric asymmetry and the historical development of Western society' (Freedman 2011:655). He sees the most significant question in the book as: what kind of world has the asymmetric nature of the brain created? This dominant Western culture that is despaired of by postcolonial critics such as Chinua Achebe (2003) and Gayatri Spivak (2000) is proposed by McGilchrist as causing the modern personal and cultural disease of schizophrenia involving '...hyper-rationalism, hyper-reflexive self-awareness, disengaged emotionality, and disembodied existence...' (2011:655). These attributes dominate as the 'defining characteristics of Western culture'.

Such an attempt to 'answer whether the lateralisation of cerebral function has influenced history' is described in review by Alan Carson going 'far, far beyond the available data' (498). In contrast, for Aaron Gare, McGilchrist's work is based on Nietzsche's view that 'the goal of science is the destruction of the world' (2012:415), and 'the usurpation of power by the left hemisphere has engendered a sickly culture characterized by a mechanistic view of the world, domination by instrumental reason, fragmentation, the loss of meaning and loss of direction, all combined with fatuous optimism' (416). The defence of the arts and the humanities is appealing, but it is much more than this. McGilchrist shows that 'reductionist science, and the culture it supports, is...a symptom of a neuropathology' (Gare 2012: 194). Its results are evident, says McGilchrist, in 'the left hemisphere's intemperate attacks on nature, art, religion and the body, the main routes to something beyond its power (2010:230). The left hemisphere has, of course, contributed greatly, through scientific materialism, to the development of medicine, engineering, manufacturing and many other positive elements of western culture. However, it is the right hemisphere that takes in new materials/ideas and accepts paradox because 'there is a tendency of the left hemisphere to deny discrepancies that do not fit its already generated schema of things' whilst the 'right hemisphere, by contrast, is actively watching for discrepancies' (Mc Gilchrist 2010:41). This involves the capacity to think metaphorically that is central to the arts. Gare sees McGilchrist's work as a major 'contribution to understanding and overcoming the nihilistic state of our culture. This brings into focus the problematic state of the arts, of disciplines within the humanities and science generally, and underlies all the major problems currently facing civilization...it is associated with an inability to appreciate context, to empathise, to appreciate the importance of symbols, metaphors and narratives' (Gare 2012: 439/40).

In describing the takeover of the master by the emissary, McGilchrist explains how 'the assertive, predicative, definitional, classificatory idiom' of the West has acted and continues to act so as to develop a 'rational-technological mastery over life' (2010:158). Gare says of this that 'it shows how what is portrayed as progress is really an assault on life', a 'pseudo progress' (2012:441). The implications of this for the domination by Eurowestern values are complex, but include a recognition that the powerful in this culture have a mindset dominated by the emissary.

V. Cultural metanarratives

Clearly, once again, there is no anterior position such as sighed for in the search for a Theory of Ubiquity or such as might be seen in the Enlightenment. In discussing the former, Mark Buchanan claims that the world is simpler than we think because: '*...networks of things of all kinds – atoms, molecules, species, people, and even ideas – have a marked tendency to organise themselves along similar lines*'(2000:14). He argues that universality is central to all life conditions and that '*...the kinds of organisation that can exist in the world are actually quite limited.*' (2000:84) and that there is '*...a kind of universality at work at the level of people*(2000:158) The West sighs for and certainly works towards verification of its own cultural metanarratives.

Almost all of this thinking about and yearning for universality is spoken not by the native subordinate, but by the dominant westerner within the metanarratives of their cultural paradigms. In those parts of the world colonised out of Europe that are attempting to establish their postcolonial identity, the 'history-war' is yet another stumbling-block. The history that has been constructed as 'reality' is itself out of Europe: it is not, for example, congruent with Indigenous Australians knowledge that supported them for over 40,000 years. Similarly, it is clear that the colonial

archives of the British Raj and business records of The East India Company were very well kept, and act powerfully to construct India as an English imaginary and reality. This highlights the interdependence of the imaginary as a tool of construction of cultural realities. It can be seen that this imaginary is as impactful upon the lived experience of the subordinate Indians as it is upon that of the Raj. Spivak says of this extraordinary interdependence: 'The colonizer constructs himself as he constructs the colony. The relationship is intimate, an open secret that cannot be part of official knowledge' (2002:203). In constructing himself in relation to India, the coloniser does not act for one alone: he enacts the British view of India and imprints that as a cultural metanarrative. This metanarrative acts as a more powerful experience of the colonised lands than the experience of the colonised themselves, however long and complex their pre-colonial history may be. For example, Africans '...did not understand what was happening to them, except that the invasion that overtook them was a plague more devastating than slave hunters, locusts, red ants, and incantations that brought the smell of death'. Their past was overcome by European forces that were '...greedy, brutal, and insatiable when it came to food, drink, women, animals, skins, ivory...' (Llosa 2010:35).

In a geographic sense, the 'native' is subordinate (the emissary has replaced the 'master?') and other even in their own lands in the colonial moment. In an imagined, constructed and even historically 'known' sense, the native remains subordinate in the postcolonial moment as there is no possibility of a return to the culture that existed before colonisation. In effect, the Western view of the world that began with geographic and cultural dominance and that brought religion and commerce as powerful exploitative allies is always there to be dealt with. '...explanations and discourses are irreducibly fractured by the epistemic violence of monopoly imperialism...the correct configurations are usually taken to be found only in Europe...' (Spivak 2002:219-20) Today, globalisation and/as a neo-colonial Western metanarrative offers another question to ask about what it is to be subordinate to Western cultural metanarratives: if cyberspace is being colonised in the same way, what is the place for the non-Westerner?

Experiential research, in opening up possibilities for different ways of establishing, analysing and critiquing knowledge, as well as adding to it, offers way to bridge the divide between eurowestern knowledge models and the subordinate 'other' to resolve their differences. Butler-Kisber and Poldma represent collage and concept mapping as opening up research modes to visual as well as verbal actions, and this will facilitate many non-traditional ways of knowing. In the design sciences, for example, Thomas Straatemeir, Luca Bertolini and Marco teBrommelstroet describe it as understanding oriented rather than change oriented and discuss how it is not explanatory but is an 'experiential cycle' (2010:580). For them, experiential research, like experiential learning, has four main aspects: 'observation of and reflection on concrete experience...forming of abstract concepts...tested in new situations...resulting in the adaptation of existing practices (that is concrete experience)...' (581). This drawing together of the concrete (practice) and the abstract (critical theory) is central to their views of experiential research based on reflective practice. They contend that '...by bringing the two worlds together in the production of knowledge it might be easier to strike a balance between rigour and relevance, between knowledge that is on the one hand theoretically and empirically sound and on the other hand is useful for and valued by the practitioners who have to use this type of knowledge' (588).

Experiential knowledge provides academic insights into the lived experience of the research subject providing ways of 'knowing through direct face-to-face encounter, empathy, and resonance with a person, place, or thing...it is in some senses inaccessible to direct conscious awareness' (Reason 2006:195).

VI. Experience and/of the divided brain.

According to McGilchrist, the right hemisphere of the brain should be the master and the left its emissary as '...there is evidence of left-hemisphere dominance for local, narrowly focussed attention and right-hemisphere dominance for broad, global, and flexible attention' (2010:39-40). This means that the right accepts the new hence leading to possibility, and the left the known hence relying on predictability. The left protects the given, the right accepts difference, and this is true of words and meanings. Moreover, whilst the right has access to the left's 'style', the opposite is not so. Creativity relies '...on the unity of things that are also maintained separately' (2010:42), although '...the left hemisphere takes a local short-term view, whereas the right hemisphere sees the bigger picture' (43). Abstract, metaphoric and non-linear thought is supported by the right hemisphere, whereas the left processes decontextualised data 'following the internal logic of the situation' and literal or even clichéd language (50/51). The right is interested in the personal and individual, and the left the impersonal.

Such neurological insights are important in developing greater insights into the ways that experiential research can add to scholarly knowledge. They bring forward new ways of building bridges across the qualitative/quantitative divide. Experiential research is made readily understandable when we consider the visual arts. For example, studio based research involves the integration of practicum with scholarship leading to the recognition that creativity is relevant to the academy. It is not merely an object of scholarly research but an integral part of it, offering new ways of knowing compared with traditional modes. Experiential research is an important aspect of such (PL/BR) research. There is much privileged academic discussion about the importance of studio in research. Indeed, studio experience is a central theme in creative industry research. For example, Nancy de Freitas

sees that the skills of creativity are enhanced by ensuring that ‘studio methods are defined and applied to reveal the intellectual and creative substance of the artwork or design’ (2002:1).

The practicum studio may be both real and virtual or a combination of each. Certainly, electronic technological advances have led to new practical and academic opportunities. Ernest Edmonds et al (2005) state that technology ‘provides the creativity researcher with opportunities to understand the multi-dimensional characteristics of the creative process’ (2005:452). Edmonds et al see ‘computer support for creativity’ as bridging ‘the gulf between the creative practitioners and the creativity researchers’. This is based upon their thesis that ‘research and practice are interdependent activities that have mutual benefits as well as discrete activities’ (2005:453). Edmonds et al show that technology can only be useful to practitioners according to ‘...the conditions in which it takes place.’ (2005:454). For them, ‘a fundamental requirement of an environment for creative practice is that it supports and enables the development of *new* forms and the new knowledge that is required to achieve such outcomes’ (2005:455). Edmonds et al offer a very useful description of the studio as the basis for their work of organising an e-studio:

‘In the creative arts, the Studio is the ‘natural’ working environment where the artist dreams, explores, experiments and creates. It is usually a closely guarded personal space in which the works in progress are brought into being, assessed and made ready for exhibition, or sometimes discarded. The point at which the works become publicly available is the choice of the individual concerned. Another kind of studio, more akin to those of earlier times is the kind of studio which is populated by many people, from master artists and apprentices to visiting patrons or prospective buyers. The main point of the Studio is that it is an experimental or a development space, as distinct from an exhibition space. The existence of studios of whatever kind, are as essential to the artist as the laboratory as to the scientist’ (2005:455).

Of course, the studio differs for each creative artist: for a writer it could be a computer screen in a café! For a photographer it could be almost anywhere for shooting, although post- production today occurs at the computer screen whilst a film-make will be on set initially, and so on for other ‘creatives’.

VII. Conclusion

Within the academy the Enlightenment modes of knowledge and data production are still dominant. This is, of course, apposite for many scientific areas, but not for the study of human behaviours. As Mary Midgley says, science does what science does magnificently, but should not be called upon to do the same in the arts and social sciences as that is not its job (Midgely 2010). Because we are formed and informed by our cultural environs and societal practices, it is very difficult indeed to step outside them and to evaluate them differently. As Terry Eagleton (1988) says, it’s extremely difficult to critique the culture that forms you, or even to see its influences

Experiential research provides us with both a scholarly practice and a theoretical prism so as to alter our given or known perspectives. It provides another way to enrich our critical evaluations of cultural metanarratives and givens and enables us to look at narratives that exist outside the credentialed academic privileged discourse. Such narratives may come from sources that are unavailable to the usual ways of collecting representational data. The ways in which we do so within the academy have been challenged by many postmodernist and other theoretical perspectives but the paradox is that most of these come from and reside within the academy itself. Gayatri Spivak calls this euroamerican domination of the academy through culture, globalisation and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Indian novelist and political activist Arundhati Roy is damning about this, saying that ‘the British empire has morphed into the American empire’ (2010:125) and that ‘a significant section of the American economy depends on the sale of weapons’ (2010:124), hence America needs to be at war. She states that ‘it’s always historically been white people coming to black countries to tell us about ourselves’ (2010:134), and as a result, ‘millions of people aren’t heard’ (2010:151). It is this lacuna that the academy seems to prevent from being adequately filled, and experiential research provides one way of filling this gap.

Storytelling through the arts is the most ancient of human discourses. Throughout time all human knowledge, ideas and information have been told as a story. Many such stories have been designated as fictional by Eurowestern knowledge brokers, and this is particularly evidenced in the academy. As such, they have been discredited or even ignored within knowledge structures except as an object of study by credentialed academics. For example, Indigenous Australian beliefs, mores, rules, regulations and societal practices have long been published by white claimants as ‘myths and legends’.

Even narratives that make a truth claim struggle to be seen much less accepted as a part of academic knowledge structures. This has particular relevance for non Euroamerican narratives, whether their claim is to be fictional or realistic representations of a world outside the western paradigms that dominate scholarly knowledge. For example, Roy describes her non-fictional political and activist writing as ‘wrenched out of me’, as she has to tell the story of her people’s needs: ‘I can’t not, because the story clamours to be told’ In this context, she describes herself as ‘the go-between that sits down and tells it...’ (2010:99). Roy sees Western lives as controlled and etiolated in a way that Indian lives, which she sees existing in a ‘wilderness’, are not. She alerts us to a reading of westerners as ‘a walking bar code...everything is civilized and tagged and valued and put in its place’. As a contrast that she

sees not only as valuable but as essential to an understanding of the breadth and depth of the human condition, she describes India as a place where ‘wilderness still exists’, and defines such wilderness as ‘the indoctrinated wilderness of the mind, full of untold secrets and wild imaginings...space that hasn’t been completely mapped and taken over and trademarked’ (2010:93). Such an indoctrinated wilderness must surely be valued, acknowledged and explored within global knowledge domains for the academy to flourish. Roy sees that it enables a belief that another way of living is possible rather than the restrictive capitalism that strangles westerners. To fight debilitating and impersonal capitalism, she recommends an optimism based upon ‘being irrational, unreasonable, magical, stubborn...’ (2010:191). Traditional knowledge structures reject the individual and their passionate commitment to telling their narrative. They look for restraint, balance, evidence, replication and a disinterested narrator who tried to remain unknown and even unknowable within the discourse. Roy rejects this as ‘cowardly’ and insists ‘on the right to be emotional, to be sentimental, to be passionate’ (2010:98). The work McGilchrist has put forward certainly supports this.

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